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Union Structure and 
Rank and File Revolt 
The Israeli Expérience 
Abraham Friedman 
The high rate of unauthorized strikes in Israël can 
be attributed to the structural dualistn of the largest and 
most important trade union in Israël — the Histadruth. 
In structural dualism a référence is made to the incom-
patihility between the organiz.ational characteristics of the 
upper échelons of the union, i.e., the trade union depart-
ment and those of the lower échelons, i.e. the workers' 
committees. Their goals and relationship with their con-
stituency and political parties are incongruous. While the 
trade union department adhères to the prescriptions of the 
national économie policies as put forward by the Labor 
Alignment party, workers' committees are committed to 
the short run économie goals of their members at the shop 
level. 
Several scholars hâve suggested that there are a limited number of 
ways by which the rank and file of a trade union can express its dissatis-
faction with the top union leadership. l Weber discusses the following 
four methods which can be used by the union membership to show its 
discontent with leadership : 
a) they can engage in an unau-
thorized strike, 
b) they can fail to ratify contracts 
negotiated and agreed upon by 
the union leadership, 
FRIEDMAN, A., Senior Lecturer, 
School of Business Administration, The 
Hebrew University of Jérusalem, Jé-
rusalem, Israël. 
* This paper was written while the author was a fellow of the Levi Eshkol 
Institute for Economie, Social and Political Research. The author is grateful for the 
helpful comments of Albert Blum and Myron Roomkin. 
1
 See, for example, Derek C. BOK and John T. DUNLOP, Labor and the 
American Communiîy. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1970, pp. 78-79; John T. 
DUNLOP, «The Function of the Strike,» in John T. DUNLOP and Neil W. CHAM-
BERLAIN (Eds.), Frontiers of Collective Bargaining. New York; Harper and Row 
Publishers, 1967, p. 108; Arnold R. WEBER, «Stability and Change in the Structure 
of Collective Bargaining,» in Lloyd ULMAN (Ed.), Challenges to Collective Bargaining. 
Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967, pp. 30-32. 
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c) they can oust the leaders of the union, 
d) they can leave the union and join another trade union — a défec-
tion from the parent union usually done by dissenting locals.2 
Of thèse, only the first one is available to the Israeli trade union 
rank and file. In the Collective Agreement Act (1957), there is no re-
quirement for membership ratification of collective agreements nego-
tiated and signed by the central union leadership and in practice only on 
rare occasions are they ratified by rank and file. Nomination of in-
duviduals for leadership positions in the national union is conducted by 
the relevant organs of the différent political parties that participate in 
the union. The élection is a political one, i.e., the member votes for a 
political party thus electing the candidates nominated by the party. Rank 
and file hâve no voice in the sélection of candidates for central union 
positions. Histadruth (the General Fédération of Workers in Israël) is 
the single important gênerai union in Israël, as it comprises 74% of 
Israeli wage earners, and another 8% are members of other unions.3 
A rival gênerai union, National Labor Fédération, is structured similarly 
to the Histadruth and follows the Histadruth pattern in collective agree-
ments.4 Ail other unions are relatively small and encompass only a few 
related occupations ; the only rival union of relative importance is the 
independent union of high school teachers. Thus, the possibilities of 
local défections are very remote. As a resuit, the only effective method 
available to Israeli workers to show their discontent with their leaders is 
participation in unauthorized strikes. 
Table 1 présents statistics on strikes in Israël during the period 
1960-1973. 
In the last thirteen years the majority of strikes that took place in 
Israël were unauthorized strikes.5 If work days lost are considered, a 
similar trend is observable: a substantial portion of work days lost in 
strikes were lost in unauthorized strikes. The relatively high intensity 
of unauthorized strikes is one of the spécial characteristics of collective 
bargaining in Israël. A similar high rate of unauthorized strikes can be 
2
 Arnold R. WEBER, «Stability and Change in the Structure of Collective 
Bargaining,» op. cit. 
3
 Abraham BRONSTEIN, Histadruth Society on Its Anniversary (Hebrew). 
Tel-Aviv: The Executive Committee, Histadruth, 1970, p. 29. 
4
 See description in Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Law and Practice in 
Israël, Report No. 315, Washington, D. C : U. S. Department of Labor, 1967, p. 49. 
5
 Government Statistics on strikes in Israël are available only since 1960. 
Strikes : 
Number 
Workdays Lost 
Percent Unauthorized 
Number of Strikes 
Workdays Lost 
Partial Strikes : 
Number 
TABLE 1 
Strike Statistics — Israël — 1960-72 
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135 128 146 127 138 277 286 142 100 114 163 169 165 93 
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Lock-Outs : 
Number 
Workdays Lost 
5 7 8 4 6 2 18 10 4 4 8 9 3 3 
13,216 73,248 7,605 4,728 9,628 218 16,546 5,327 1,972 1,221 15,824 24,678 1,242 6,452 
SOURCES: Institute for Social and Economie Research, Histadruth: Strikes and Lock-outs, 1960-1965 (Hebrew), 
Tel-Aviv: Executive Committee, Histadruth, 1965. Institute for Social and Economie Research, Histadruth: Strikes 
and Lock-outs, 1967-1969 (Hebrew), Tel-Aviv: Executive Committee, Histadruth, 1970. Ministry of Labor, Department 
for Industrial Relations: Strikes, Lock-outs, and Labor Conflicts in 1968-1971 (Hebrew), Jérusalem: Ministry of Labor, 
1972. Ministry of Labor, Department for Industrial Relations, Strikes, Lock-outs and Labor Conflicts in 1972-1973 
(Hebrew). Jérusalem: Ministry of Labor, 1974. 
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found in a few other countries, e.g., Britain, though the characteristics 
and causes of thèse strikes are différent in différent countries.6 
The high rate of unauthorized strikes in Israël is the resuit of 
intraorganizational tensions within the Histadruth. Thèse tensions are 
attributed to the structural dualism of the Israeli labor movement. It 
will be shown hère that while the upper échelons can be characterized 
as a political union, the lower ones resemble a business union.7 As thèse 
two types of unions differ in their goals, functions, tactics, organiza-
tional structure, membership, leadership and relations with political 
parties, there exist two différent organizational structures within the 
trade union department of the Histadruth. 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE HISTADRUTH 
The Histadruth is a unique trade union inasmuch as in addition to 
being an "ordinary" trade union, it is also a large employer, the second 
largest in Israël — the first being the State itself; the largest supplier 
of health care and health insurance programs in Israël, it maintains and 
administers large pension and welfare funds; it is very active in the 
educational and cultural arena and it extends an elaborate and complex 
network of international relations.8 In order to fulfill ail of its rôles, the 
Histadruth has developed a highly complex organizational structure. 
Chart 1 présents the unique organizational structure of the Histadruth. 
Some of the structural relationships between the différent organizational 
units were formally defined by the Histadruth constitution, others de-
veloped informally. 
6
 See discussion and data in: J. E. T. ELDRIDGE, Industrial Disputes, 
London, Routledge and Kegan, Paul, 1968, Ch. 2, pp. 68-90; Jack STIEBER, «Unauthor-
ized Strikes under the American and British Industrial Relations Systems,» British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, V, 1968, pp. 232-238. 
7
 A typology of trade unions which describes the characteristics of political 
and business unions can be found in: Robert F. HOXIE, Trade Unionism in the United 
States, (New York; D. Appleton and Company, 1920), pp. 45-52. Clark KERR, John 
T. DUNLOP, Frederick H. HARBISON and Charles A. MYERS, Industrialism and 
Industrial Man. New York, Oxford University Press. 1964, pp. 193-207. (In this paper 
we use the term business unions for workers' organizations in countries where the 
industrializing élite is middle class, and the term political unions for organizations in 
countries where the élite is revolutionary-intellectual.) A detailed description of thèse two 
types of unions is presented in Abraham FRIEDMAN, «Workers' Committees and the 
Trade-Union Department of the Histadruth — Partners or Rivais,» in Abraham 
FRIEDMAN (Ed.), Structural Changes in Lahor Unions (Hebrew). Tel-Aviv, Industrial 
Relations Research Association of Israël, 1972, pp. 23-27. 
8
 Detailed description of the rôles and functions of the Histadruth as they are 
defined by its constitution can be found in: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Lahor Law and 
Practice in Israël, op. cit., p. 50. 
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CHART 1 
The General Fédération of Workers in Israël 
" — 1 
DEPARTMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Trade Union | 
Absorption of 
Immigrants 
Diaspora Finance & Account s Légal Rel ig ious Af fa i r s V o c a t i o n a l ' T r a i n i n ^ B 
Arab Workers I n s t . for Economie &. Soc ia l Rc.icnrnh Higher Education Organiza t ion 
Div. for Safcty 
and Hygiène 
Workers1 1 
P a r t i c i p a t i o n 1 
Consuw-r Fro tec t io : . Center for 
r-lu.-;. Culture 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l P ro fe s s iona l s Center for Foci.il rVcurit.v 
Youth and Sports • 
LOCAL LAPOR CO!JNCILG--Mm-ERS' C0NOTTTEE3—AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES 
AetinG «lso as V.:-i e l e c t e d orfiuns of llovra Source: Center for Cul ture und Ulueation of tlic Kiutadruth , 1972. 
Functionally, the Histadruth is divided into four departments, 
namely: The trade union department; Hevrat-Ovdim — the governing 
body of Histadruth's économie enterprises; the social security depart-
ment which includes Kupat-Holim — the health service and insurance 
organization and the différent pension and welfare funds ; the center for 
culture and éducation. Thèse departments function independently of 
each other, though they share the same top executives — the secretary 
gênerai, the executive bureau, the executive committee, the council 
and the convention of the Histadruth. 
Since this paper deals with the Histadruth function as a trade 
union, it will focus on the structure of the trade union department. Chart 
2 présents the formai organizational structure of the trade union de-
partment. It is immediately observable that the department is organized 
along two parallel and competing Unes: one according to geographical 
location, i.e., the local labor councils, the other by occupational or 
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CHART 2 
The Organizational Structure of the Trade Union Department 
Trade Union 
Department 
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Transpor-
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Défense I 
Industr.y I 
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Workers 
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1 Printing, 1 
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J Workers 
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1 Text i le , 
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Electr ica l 
Company 'Tourguides P las t ics & Rubber ][ Working Youth 
Locals of National Unions and Associations - Local Labor Cjuncils 
\'Jorkers ' Committees at the Work Places 
Source: General Fédération of Workers in Israël, Report of the Trade Union Department 
to the I2th Convention (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: The Executive Committee, 1973), p. 3. 
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industrial affiliation, i.e., the différent associations, unions and organiza-
tions on both the national and local levels. The chairman, together with 
the other 42 members of the trade union department, direct and super-
vise the activities of the intermediate level organizations, while the 
opérations of the lower échelon of the trade union department, namely, 
the workers' committees, are directed and controlled, at least formally, 
jointly by the intermediate level organizations of both types — oc-
cupational and geographical. 
The attempt to fit any one of the theoretical types of trade unions 
to the Histadruth is bound to fail as it encounters conflicting informa-
tion for the characteristics of the différent organizational levels of the 
trade union department. The attempt to fit a theoretical type of trade 
union to the Histadruth is successful once the discussion is separated 
into two parts, one covering the characteristics of the workers' com-
mittees and other those of the trade union department — referring to 
ail the organizational organs of the trade union department excluding 
workers' committees. The idéal type of business union fits pretty well 
the workers' committees, while the trade union department can be 
described as a political union. A detailed comparison and analysis of 
the characteristics of workers' committees and the trade union depart-
ment will be presented next.9 
CHARACTERISTICS OF WORKERS' COMMITTEES AND THE 
TRADE UNION DEPARTMENT 
The upper and lower échelons of the Histadruth trade union will 
be compared by analyzing their following characteristics: goals, fonc-
tions, tactics, structure, membership, leadership, finance, and relations 
with political parties. 
Goals — The orientation of the trade union department is toward 
long-range, gênerai goals. Its goals encompass large sections of society, 
namely the working class, and the economy as a whole. The goals of the 
9
 This comparison will be based on formai documents, e.g., Histudruth con-
stitutions, and the différent labor laws of Israël, and on empirical data. The source for 
the empirical data on the characteristics of workers1 committees is from a study of 
workers' committees in industrial plants with more than 50 employées. See Abraham 
FRIEDMAN, Workers' Committees Study (Hebrew). Tel-Aviv, Institute for Economie 
and Social Research, 1963. The source of the information on the opinions and attitudes 
of the Histadruth's rank-and-file is an extensive public opinion survey of Histadruth 
members in the three largest cities in Israël and their suburbs. See A. FRIEDMAN, 
«Workers' Committees and the Trade Union Department,» op. cit., pp. 22-40. 
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trade union department are best represented by the wage policy pursued 
by it. 
Since its establishment in 1941, the trade union department, earned itself an im-
portant rôle in collective bargaining on working conditions and became the most 
important organ that is concerned with the protection of the standard of living of 
the worker, while sharing the responsihility for the national économie policy. 10 
[Emphasis added.] 
The large emphasis on broad national goals is évident from the 
union's wage policy. Since 1950 that policy has been either to attach 
wage increases to the average increase in productivity or to hâve no 
wage increase at ail. n Thèse policies were adopted in order to help the 
government fight inflation while devoting a large part of its resources 
to défense and to absorption of new immigrants. 
The basic aspects of the union's wage policy were formulated by 
the économie committee of the leading political party in the Histadruth, 
the Labor Alignment currently, MAPAI (Israël Workers' Party) in the 
past.12 
In contrast workers' committees are orientated toward short-run, 
spécifie goals, usually increases in wages and improvements in working 
conditions at the plant level. Their loyalty is towards their constituency 
— the workers at the plant. This is évident, for example, from the fact 
that 48% of the workers' committees in industrial plants with more than 
50 employées refused to allow management to discharge an employée 
regardless of the cause, e.g., even if he was charged with theft from his 
coworkers. The rationale for this behavior is that workers' committees 
perceive themselves as the defenders of every worker against his 
employer. 
Functions — The functions of the trade union department are : 
1. Bargaining national and industry-wide collective agreements in 
accordance with the wage policy of the Histadruth. 
10
 General Fédération of Workers in Israël, Report of the Trade Union Depart-
ment to the I2th Convention (Hebrew). Tel-Aviv, The Executive Committee, 1973, p. 3. 
11
 See discussion in David METCALF, «Wage Policy in Israël,» British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 8, 1970, pp. 213-223. The descriptions of the différent 
wage policies are pretty accurate, but his prédictions with regard to the 1970-71 wage 
policy were incorrect. 
12
 See, for example, with regard to the 1970-71 wage policy: A. GALIN and 
J. TABB, «The Package Deal — A Turning Point in the Israeli Industrial Relations 
System,» Economie Quarterly, 69-70, June, 1971 (Hebrew), p. 7. 
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2. Approval of strikes and dispute seulement activities through 
médiation and arbitration even in cases of unauthorized strikes. 
3. Dealing with both spécifie and gênerai problems related to the 
économie and wage policies, e.g., taxes, priées, industrial relations, 
labor législation, incentive Systems, unionization, Arab workers, work-
ing women, fringe benefits, pensions. 
The functions of workers' committees are not defined formally, 
neither by the Histadruth constitution nor by the Collective Bargaining 
Act (1967). The Histadruth constitution spécifies only that «workers' 
committees, in coopération with the représentative of the local labor 
council, are the représentatives of ail the workers at the work place 
before their employer. » 13 It does not further specify what are the duties 
of thèse représentatives except to say that collective bargaining and the 
enforcement of the collective agreement are in the jurisdiction of the 
national unions and the local labor councils.14 
In practice, workers' committees fulfill many functions at the work 
place: 
1. In many cases (64% of industrial plants with more than 50 
employées) they bargain with the employer on wage rates, incentives, 
conditions of work, etc., above and beyond those that were agreed upon 
in the collective agreement between the employer and the trade union 
department.1S 
2. In the majority of work places they play an active and impor-
tant rôle in dealing with problems of promotion, transfer from one work 
station to another, discharge, disciplinary problems, etc. In 65% of in-
dustrial plants, workers' committees participate in the décisions about 
promotion; of thèse, in 67% of the plants, the discussion is based on a 
list of candidates supplied by the workers' committees. In 37% of the in-
dustrial plants, workers' committees intervene in the décision to transfer 
an employée from one work station to another, even if the employée 
agreed to the transfer. In 82% of the industrial plants, they are members 
in the plant's disciplinary committee, thus playing an active rôle in every 
disciplinary action. 
13
 General Fédération of Workers in Israël, Histadruth Constitution (Hebrew). 
Tel-Aviv, The Executive Committee, 1971, Ch. D, Sec. '£, p. 16. 
14
 Ibid., Ch. D, Sec. y3, 4, p. 16. 
15
 Similar fïndings were found in a study conducted in 1972 — see Shlomit 
KAMINKA, «Workers' Committees as a Focus of Labor Relations Tension in Israeli 
Industry» (Hebrew). Unpublished M.A. dissertation. Haifa, Israël, Technion, Israël 
Institute of Technology, 1972, p. 65. 
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Several of the activities of workers' committees in areas related to 
the conduct of work at the work place, are anchored in Israeli labor 
législation. This, however, has happened in an erratic fashion, and not 
in a systematic way. For example: 
a) The Labor Inspection (Organization) Law 5714-1954 spécifies 
that : « The représentatives of the employées on a safety committee shall 
be employées of the undertaking elected or appointed by the employées 
therein, or by the employées' committee, as shall be prescribed by the 
régulation. » 16 
The Régulations Concerning Safety Committees and Safety Del-
egates-1960 specify that the employées' delegates will be appointed by 
the employées' committees (workers' committees), and one of the del-
egates has to be a member of the employées' committee which will 
hâve no other duty assigned to him by the employées' committee. 
b) The Annual Holidays Act — 1951 spécifies that «the holiday 
shall be continuous. The employée and the employer may, however, by 
mutual consent and with the agreement of the local committee of em-
ployées, if there is one, break up the holiday. » 17 
3. They initiate, support and direct cultural and social activities 
among the workers. 80% of the workers' committees in industrial plants 
were engaged in cultural activities. Ail the workers' committees engage 
in one form or another of welfare activities — the most fréquent one is 
arrangement of loans without interest or with low interest to needy 
employées.18 
Tactics — In order to achieve its goals the trade union department 
employs several différent tactics. It employs législation and political 
lobbying as well as strikes and économie pressure on employers. In the 
last two years the labor législation department of the Histadruth sug-
gested changes in the following acts: Severence Pay Act (1963), Equal 
Pay to Women and Men Act (1964), Youth Employment Act (1953), 
Apprenticeship Act (1953) and suggested a new act that will secure the 
employées rights in the case of bankruptcy.19 In addition to thèse ac-
16
 Labor Inspection (Organization) Law 5714, Part 2, 11 in State of Israël, 
Ministry of Labor, Labor Laws, offset reprint from the législative séries of the I.L.O., 
Jérusalem, 1968, p. 145. 
17
 Annual Holidays Act — 1951, Division II, 8, in ibid., p. 22. 
18
 Ibid., pp. 24, 55-56. 
19
 General Fédération of Workers in Israël, Report of the Sections of the Trade 
Union Department to the 12th Convention, Part 4 (Hebrew). Tel-Aviv, The Executive 
Committee, 1973, pp. 24-28. 
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tivities the trade union department had approved and directed several 
strikes. Thèse strikes are of two types: 1. Strikes in large work places 
where the union wants to establish a new wage rate, incentive method 
or major changes in working conditions, and by the tactic of whip-
sawing, spread it to the whole industry. The strike in the plants of the 
« Elite» firm in 1972, which lasted for 53 days, is a good example for this 
type of strike. The issues on which the strike focused were: change in 
status of employées from daily workers to monthly after twelve years 
of work, equal starting wage rate to maies and femaies, and increases in 
wage rates and fringe benefits.20 The demands of the union were above 
and beyond those agreed upon in the collective agreement for the food 
industry and the gênerai wage policy of the Histadruth. 2. Strikes in 
workplaces, usually those with few employées, in order to organize the 
work-place or to enforce the terms of collective agreement. 
The trade union department has a policy not to approve strikes 
which are contrary to the union's wage policy or that conflict with the 
interests of the economy. « The criteria according to which the depart-
ment is acting in the case of a labor conflict are: Are the demands 
justified? Can the economy stand the fulfillment of the demands or are 
they harmful to the industry or the economy as a whole? Are the de-
mands consistent with the Histadruth's wage policy? Can the employées 
stand the strike and carry it on ? Had they tried ail the available bargain-
ing channels? Does the déclaration of a strike oppose the existing 
législation?»21 Thus, in many cases the trade union department will not 
approve strikes that were declared at the plant level as they do not fill 
the above mentioned conditions. 
Workers' committees try to promote their cause by means of éco-
nomie pressures, mainly strikes and strike threats. They initiate the 
actions at the plant level, which are sometimes supported by the trade 
union department and sometimes opposed. In 64% of the industrial 
plants, workers' committees were able to secure working conditions 
above those of the applicable collective agreement. Of thèse cases the 
trade union department supported 40% of the workers' committees, was 
indiffèrent in 44% of the cases, and opposed the actions in 16% of the 
cases. The trade union department has very little control over the strike 
activities of the workers' committees, especially the large and strong 
ones. This is due to the fact that a failure to get an approval of a strike 
20
 General Fédération of Workers in Israël, Report of the Trade Union Depart-
ment, op. cit., p. 25. 
21
 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
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by the trade union department is of very little conséquence to the in-
dividuals that take part in them, since in Israël the practice in the 
majority of the strikes was to pay the employées back payment for the 
period of the strike regardless of the outcome of the strike. Currently, 
there is mounting public pressure, supported by the Ministry of Labor to 
stop this practice, and use the union strike fund in order to compensate 
the strikers for their loss of income. 
Organizational Structure — The Histadruth is unique in being a 
«gênerai» trade union; Le., it is a trade union which encompasses ail 
the political idéologies, as well as most occupations and industries. It 
includes political parties from the extrême left, namely the two com-
munist parties, to the extrême right, namely GAHAL (the Heruth-
Liberal block) and the Independent Libérais party; also included is a 
religious party. 
The organizational structure of the Histadruth developed from the 
top to the bottom. Though, for example, the Histadruth was established 
in 1920 and the internai structure was developed in 1923, the trade union 
department was not established until 1941 and the national unions and 
associations was not established until 1945. 
The authority within the trade union department is highly cen-
tralized. With the chairman and the members of the department holding 
most of the authority internally while the major décisions are made by 
the secretary gênerai of the Histadruth, the executive committee and 
the executive bureau. This is évident from the conduct of collective 
bargaining and the procédure used for the approval of strikes. 
The trade union department, upon the approval of the executive 
committee and the executive bureau formulâtes, at least once every two 
years, the union's wage policy, which covers wages and fringe benefits. 
This wage policy has to be submitted for approval by both the executive 
bureau and the executive committee. Negotiations on industry-wide or 
craft-wide contracts or on a collective agreement with an employer that 
is not concentrated in one geographical area are handled by the members 
of trade union department. Usually, the secretaries of the national 
unions involved in the agreement will also participate in the bargaining. 
Sometimes the members of the trade union department take part, even 
in negotiations on the plant level. 
Strikes by a national organization hâve to be approved by the trade 
union department. The approval of a strike in a plant is in the power of 
both the local labor council and the appropriate national union. 
274 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 31, NO 2 
Workers' committee s represent the workers at the shop level, and 
in many cases there are several workers' committees at the same work-
place each representing différent occupations. Usually the séparation is 
between blue collar workers, white collar workers and professionals. 
Thus, it goes without saying that the gênerai organizational structure 
of workers' committees is decentralized since there is at least one com-
mittee for every workplace. 
Formally, the authority of workers' committees was never defined 
either by the Histadruth or by the législature. In practice, most work-
ers' committees enjoy a high degree of autonomy, especially workers' 
committees in large plants or in establishments providing an essential 
service or product, where in many instances they act independently of 
the trade union department when the spécifie situation calls for such an 
action. Yet, most workers' committees recognize the fact that they 
would hâve got less from their employers without the support of the 
local labor council. 
In most of those cases where the employer has many plants or 
many branches of the same establishment, the workers' committees 
established at each plant or branch join together and establish a national 
workers' committee. The national workers' committee is composed of 
représentatives of the participating workers' committees, which are ap-
pointed by their committees or elected by spécial, personal, direct 
élections. The national workers' committees are highly independent; in 
1972 the secretary gênerai of the Histadruth made the remark that in 
the last two years the Histadruth did not take part in any of the col-
lective bargaining conducted by the national workers' committees. 
Most of the day to day décision making and activities of the 
workers' committees are carried out by the secretary of the committee. 
In large enterprises the position of a secretary of the committee is a 
full-time position which is fully paid by the employer; other members of 
the committee get time off their work in order to take part in the com-
mittee activities. The costs of thèse activities are, usually, also absorbed 
by the employer. 
Membership — Membership in the Histadruth and its branches is 
open to ail workers 18 years old or older, who live on their earnings 
from their own work without exploiting the work of others, who agrée to 
abide by the rules and décisions of the officiai organs of the Histadruth. 
Membership in the Histadruth is personal and is conditional upon not 
being a member of any other workers' organization. Membership is also 
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dépendent upon regular payment of the Histadmth dues, which can be 
paid directly or checked off by the employer.22 
Every member has to belong to a local trade union which covers 
an occupation or industry and only to one such union.23 If employment 
conditions demand the establishment of a national trade union, it will 
be established. Membership in the relevant national craft or industrial 
union is compulsory. A worker can belong only to one of the national 
trade unions.24 
The appeal of the Histadmth to its members is based mainly on the 
health and welfare services that it supplies. Yet the majority of the 
members were compelled to join the union or became members some-
time in their past and cannot explain why they remain members. Only 
a small portion are members because of the trade union activities. 
Table 2 présents data on the distribution of urban Histadmth members 
by reason of membership. 
TABLE 2 
Reason for Membership in the Histadmth by Type of Membership (Percent) 
Type of Membership 
Total Members Housewives 
Reason 
Compulsory, dues are withheld 
automatically 32 24 49 
Personal reasons, habit, 
entered many years ago 22 24 18 
Health Insurance and services 16 15 17 
Ideology 15 19 8 
Pro te et ion of e mp loy e e s 13 16 6 
No answer 2 2 2 
Total 100 
«Public Opinion 
100 
of the Histadmth,» J 
100 
SOURCE: A. Friedman, et al., . Ulitzki 
Histadmth Yearbook 1965 (Hebrew). Tel-Aviv: Executive Committee of the 
Histadmth, 1966, p. 538. 
22
 See, General Fédération of Workers in Israël, Histadmth Constitutions, 
op. cit., Ch. C, pp. 14-15. 
" Ibid., Ch. D, Sec. II/2, p. 16. 
24
 Ibid., Ch. D, Sec. 111/1, 2, 3, p. 17. 
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The commitment of the rank-and-file towards the Histadruth's 
policies in gênerai and the trade union department's wage policies is not 
stable. In récent years whenever the trade union department had sup-
ported a restrained wage policy dictated by the Labor Alignment, it was 
supported only by a minority of the members. In a study conducted in 
1965 it was found that only 35% of Histadruth members in large urban 
settlements had supported the Histadruth wage freezing policy, while 
44% disapproved of the policy, with 22% giving no reply. Yet, in those 
cases where the Histadruth tries to increase the wage levels or fringes it 
générâtes relatively large support from the membership. In the same 
study 60% of the members felt that without the activities of the trade 
union department the level of their fringe benefits would hâve been 
lower, while only 40% felt that without thèse activities the level of their 
wages would hâve been lower. 
Members are recruited directly and through workplaces especially 
those that are union shops. According to a récent législation the union 
has the right to collect «organization dues» from the nonmembers at 
workplaces covered by collective agreements negotiated by the union, 
this lowered the cost of joining the union.25 The fact that about 53% of 
the immigrants join the Histadruth during their first year of stay in 
Israël can be attributed to a large extent to the fact that during the 
first 6 months of their stay in the country, new immigrants get free 
health insurance from the Histadruth.26 
There is not necessarily a relationship between the fact that the 
employées are Histadruth members and the fact that the workplace is 
unionized or not. There are some workplaces, mainly in the service 
sector where the majority of the employées are Histadruth members, yet 
the workplace is not organized and the Histadruth members might not 
vote for organizing the workplace. Thus, the fact that about 75% of the 
wage earners are Histadruth members does not necessarily serve as an 
estimate for the degree of unionization of workplaces in Israël. 
Workers' commiitees represent only the employées of a spécifie 
workplace, sometimes only those employed in certain occupations in the 
workplace. Workers are represented by the workers' committees by 
virtue of working in a certain workplace. There are some cases where 
workers' committees are organized at the shop level without any re-
lationship to the Histadruth or any other trade union. 
25
 1970 amendment to the Wage Protection La\\\ 5718 — 1958, 25/A/3B. 
This practice similar to «agency shop» procédure in the U.S. 
26
 Abraham BRONSTEIN, Histadruth Society on Its Anniversity, op. cit., 
pp. 12-14. 
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The appeal of workers' committees to their constituency is based 
on the degree by which their goals are attained through the committees' 
activities. In the past during the late 1950's when workers' committees 
were not responsive to the demands of the members, in many plants the 
workers used to establish unofficial rival organizations known by the 
name of action committees. Currently, as workers' committees are 
responsive to the demands of their members, one will only rarely find 
an action committee. The workers show a high level of commitment to 
the workers' committees. 
Leadership — The suprême body of the Histadruth is the con-
vention. The delegates to the convention are nominated by the différent 
political parties.27 They are elected every four years in gênerai, secret, 
and proportional élections.28 The ballots in thèse élections are cast for 
political parties, which présent the voters with a list of candidates. The 
convention elects the members of the executive council by their political 
affiliation and according to the proportion of votes cast for the political 
party in the Histadruth élection.29 The executive council appoints the 
members of the executive committee, which in turn appoints ail the 
43 members of the trade union department according to the relative 
number of ballots cast for each party in the Histadruth élections.30 The 
élections for the local labor councils and the national unions and associa-
tions are very similar to the élections to the Histadruth convention, 
as the candidates are nominated by the political parties and the ballots 
are cast for a political party and not a candidate.31 Thus, the élections 
to the Histadruth organs hâve very little significance to the membership. 
As is évident from the fact that out of those members that knew to what 
national union they belong, only 33% mentioned a date when they were 
asked when the élections were held, 5% said that there were no élec-
tions, 38% said that they do not remember the date, 24% did not answer, 
compared with 80% of the workers that work at an enterprise with a 
workers' committee which mentioned the date, 12% remembered the 
élection and not the exact date and only 8% did not answer. 
The occupants of the high union positions are professional poli-
ticians. The secretary of the union is usually also a member of parlia-
27
 See, General Fédération of Workers in Israël, Proportional Elections Con-
stitution (Hebrew). Tel-Aviv, The Executive Committee, Histadruth, 1971, Ch. H, 
pp. 12-13. 
28
 See, General Fédération of Workers in Israël, Histadruth Constitutions, 
op. cit., Ch. F, Sec. I, 2, p. 20. 
29
 Ihid., Ch. F, Sec. 10, p. 21. 
30
 Ibid., Ch. H, Sec. 6, p. 22. 
•" Ibid., Ch. D, Sec. 12a, and Ch. 3, Sec. 3, pp. 18, 19. 
278 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 31, NO 2 
ment, and most of the secretaries of the union are ministers in the gov-
ernment sometime during their careers. 
There is no periodical review of the leadership performance by the 
rank and file. Thus, most of the urban members feel that they hâve no 
influence on the actions of the Histadruth (45% with 14% no answer). 
The members of the workers' committees are elected in direct 
Personal élections conducted at the shop level. In most workplaces the 
candidates are nominated according to their personal characteristics ; 
only in a small minority (22%) of the workers' committees was there a 
list of candidates endorsed by political parties. There is a tendency to 
sélect the candidates according to their departmental affiliation at the 
workplace. 
The fact that the élections of the workers' committees are direct 
means that the workers feel that they hâve an influence on the outcome 
of the élection. For this reason they are interested more in thèse élec-
tions than in élections to the national unions and hâve a deeper knowl-
edge about the élections to the workers' committees. 
There is periodical review of the leadership performance by the 
workers at the workplace. In almost ail the industrial plants gênerai 
assemblies of the employées were called and in more than half of them 
the leaders presented a financial report to the members. 
As a resuit, the leaders of the workers' committees feel that they 
hâve to be responsive to the demands and interests of their constituency. 
This is évident from the fact that when asked according to what interest 
they will act in a case of conflict of interest between the Histadruth and 
the workers at the plant, 42% responded according the Histadruth, 34% 
according to the workers, and 24% according to the spécifie case. At the 
same time 93% of them answered that they see themselves as the Hista-
druth représentatives at the plant level. 
Finance — The regular budget of the Histadruth allocates the 
available resources among the différent functional areas including the 
trade union departments. The major source of income for the Hista-
druth's regular budget is membership dues. More than half of the dues 
collected are allocated to the Histadruth's health care and insurance 
program (Kupat Holim). Most of the resources allocated to the trade 
union department are included in the «organization and culture» ac-
count. The differential allocation of membership dues among the dif-
férent functional areas of the Histadruth is presented in Table 3. 
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TABLE 3 
Allocation of Histadruths Membership Dues a 
Function Percent of Total Dues' Revenue 
KUPAT HOLIM (Health care and insurance)b 55.10 
Organization and Culture 33.30 
Strike Fund 1.00 
Employment Fund 1.00 
Labor Councils' Building Fund 1.70 
Housing Fund 1.10 
Mutual Aid Funds 6.00 
Moetzet Hapoalot (Working Womens' Council) 0.80 
Total 100.00 
SOURCE: Institute for Economie and Social Research: Histadruth Facts and Figures, 
op. cit., p. 12. 
a
 Décision of the Histadruth Executive Committee (August 15, 1971). 
b
 Not including family coverage. 
Histadruth membership dues are assessed on the basis of a pro-
gressive scale according to members' income, ranging from a minimum 
of 2.5% to a maximum of 4.5% on the first IL 1,000 of monthly earnings. 
Some 80% of Histadruth members pay their dues through a withholding 
arrangement with their employers. Ail dues collected are transfered into 
the Central Treasury of the Histadruth. The demands of ail the branches 
of the Histadruth are provided for through the yearly budget of the 
Histadruth which has to be approved by the Executive Committee.32 
Several of the spécial activities of the Histadruth are financed by spécial 
funds collected abroad or from the revenue acquired through the His-
tadruth's économie activities. 
Beside the regular dues the Histadruth also collects spécial 
voluntary political dues from its members. The goal of the political dues 
is to help the political parties finance their activities in the Histadruth. 
Political dues are assessed at a range from 0.1% to 0.5% of the first 
IL 700 of the member's monthly earnings. The sums collected together 
with an additional contribution of the Histadruth are transferred to the 
différent political parties. In 1970 out of the sum of IL 202,172,600 which 
was the total revenue of the Histadruth IL 6,091,900 or 3.01% were 
transfered to the différent political parties. 
,2
 Institute for Economie and Social Research, Histadruth Facts and Figures 
(Hebrew). Tel-Aviv, The Executive Committee, p. 12. 
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The activities of the workers' committees are financed through 
dues that are collected from the employées at the workplace. Thèse 
dues are collected, in most cases (97%), through a withholding agree-
ment with the employer. Thèse dues are collected separately and are 
independent of the regular Histadruth membership dues. 
The largest expense item in the workers' committees budget is 
gifts distributed to the employées, usually twice a year — at New Year 
and Passover. The cultural activities of the workers' committees are 
financed in most cases either by management or by the local labor 
council in 89% of the industrial plants. The time that a member of the 
workers' committee invests in his union activity is fully paid for by 
management. 
Relationship with political parties — As was mentioned before, the 
Histadruth wage policy, for ail practical purposes, is dictated to it by 
the économie committee of the Labor Alignment party. By the same 
token, union leaders are nominated and «elected» to their top leader-
ship positions by the political parties. From time to time a secretary-
general of the Histadruth has tried to pursue more independent .wage 
policies, and has been immediately caught under cross fire from both 
the party leadership and the members of the government. The end 
resuit is that the Histadruth follows to a large extent the directives 
of the political parties. 
Most workers' committees, currently, do not hâve any direct rela-
tionship with any political party, though some of them did in the past. 
In summary, it can be said that since the trade union department's 
goals structure, membership, leadership, financing, relationship with 
political parties and preferred législation are similar to the ones of 
political unions, and since its functions and tactics are a mixture of 
those of both political and business unions, the idéal type of political 
union matches quite well the trade union department. Workers' commit-
tees are best described as business unions since ail of their character-
istics are analogous to those of business unions. The implications of 
the fact that the trade union department is a political union and workers' 
committees a business union will be analyzed next. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The high rate of unauthorized strikes in Israël can be attributed 
to the structural dualism of the Histadruth, Le., the incompatibility 
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between the organizational characteristics of the trade union department 
and those of workers' committees. It was demonstrated above that 
their goals and relationship with their constituency and political parties 
are incongruous. While the trade union department adhères to the 
prescriptions of the national économie policies as put forward by the 
Labor Alignment party, workers' committees are committed to the 
short-run économie goals of their members at the shop level. This 
discrepancy between the goals of the two organizations results in a 
large number of unauthorized strikes, most of which are conducted by 
workers' committees. 
Unauthorized strikes are the only means open to workers' com-
mittees to express their dissatisfaction with the objectives of the trade 
union department. Historically, workers' committees were political 
unions, i.e., their goals were similar to those of the trade union depart-
ment, their leaders were nominated by organs of political parties and 
the ballots in the élection at the workplace were cast for political parties. 
As a resuit of the change in the union membership which joined the 
union not because of ideological reasons, but more in order to advance 
their économie situation, the pressure on the Histadruth in gênerai and 
on workers' committees in particular to change goals was mounting.33 
This pressure was manifested at the plant level by the establishment 
of action committees that were personally elected in direct élections 
conducted at many workplaces where the workers' committees pursued 
the Histadruth wage policy. In those plants where the workers' com-
mittees were responsive to the demands of the workers, as they had 
no authority to participate in collective bargaining, they showed their 
power by intervening in the management of the production process and 
related areas which are accepted as being in the realm of management 
rights. In this way, they could promote at least partially the cause of 
their members. The end resuit of this practice was that tensions that 
were accepted as «natural» between employées and their managers 
were transferred to «unnatural» tensions between the worker and his 
union.34 
In the last two décades, most workers' committees hâve changed 
their objectives. Unfortunately, this was not followed by a formai 
examination and redéfinition of their rôles, duties and authority. The 
•
u
 This change started after the establishment of the state of Israël in 1948, with 
the large immigration. See discussion in S. N. EISENSTADT, Israeli Society. New York, 
Basic Books, Inc., 1967, pp. 64-65. 
34
 See discussion in Shlomit KAMINKA, «Workers' Committees as a Focus 
of Labor Relations Tension in Israeli Industry,» op. cit., pp. 156, 162. 
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trade union department remained centralized, at least formally, assigning 
workers' committees no rôle in collective bargaining. The only way that 
was open to workers' committees was to engage informally in collective 
bargaining, which meant bargaining with the employers for wages and 
working conditions above those agreed upon between the trade union 
department and the employer. In several negotiations for collective 
agreement, workers' committees were compelled to déclare a strike that 
in most instances was unauthorized by the trade union department. 
This discussion leads to the conclusion that there is an urgent 
need for the introduction of a structural change in the trade union 
department. The only change that might be acceptable to the rank-
and-file is that one which will make the Histadruth more responsive 
to their demands, thus extending the rôle and authority of workers' 
committees in the process of collective bargaining and the formulation 
of an independent wage policy by the Histadruth. Several of the needed 
changes were introduced in récent years. Among them are: the democ-
ratization of the national trade unions, mainly through the conduct of 
élections for their suprême bodies, the création of an ad hoc committee 
by the trade union department that has to examine the différent prob-
lems related to the structure of that department, and the more inde-
pendent wage policy that was pursued by the last secretary-general 
of the Histradruth and by the current acting secretary-general.35 Thèse 
were small steps taken in the right direction. There is an urgent need 
for a major move that will change the Histadruth organizational struc-
ture towards becoming more of a business union model and less of a 
political one. 
Structure syndicale et révolte de la base: l'expérience d'Israël 
Pendant les derniers dix ans, la plupart des grèves qui se produisirent en Israël 
n'étaient pas autorisées. 
C'est là le résultat des tensions entre des différents niveaux d'autorité au sein 
de Histadruth. L'Histradruth (la Fédération générale des travailleurs en Israël) est la 
seule centrale syndicale importante en ce pays. Elle compte dans ses rangs 74 pour 
cent de l'ensemble des salariés, alors que d'autres syndicats en groupent 8 pour cent. 
Ces tensions sont attribuables à la structure dualiste du mouvement ouvrier en Israël, 
c'est-à-dire à l'antagonisme qui existe entre les caractéristiques d'organisation des 
échelons supérieurs, la centrale elle-même, et celle des échelons inférieurs, les comités 
de travailleurs. Le type absolu de syndicalisme d'affaires convient parfaitement aux 
-
,5
 General Fédération of Workers in Israël, Report of the Trade Union Depart-
ment, op. cit., pp. 6-9. 
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comités de travailleurs, alors que l'on peut considérer la centrale comme une organisation 
politique. Leurs buts et les rapports qu'ils ont avec leurs commettants et les parties 
politiques se contredisent. Cependant que la centrale endosse les directives de la poli-
tique économique nationale du parti travailliste, les comités de travailleurs recherchent 
les objectifs économiques à court terme de leurs membres au plan de l'usine. Cette di-
vergence entre les buts des deux niveaux d'organisation favorise la multiplication des 
grèves non autorisées de la part des comités de travailleurs. 
Les grèves non autorisées sont l'unique moyen laissé aux travailleurs d'exprimer 
leur opposition aux objectifs recherchés par la centrale. Historiquement, les comités de 
travailleurs étaient des syndicats politiques. Leurs buts ne différaient pas de ceux de la 
centrale. Leurs chefs étaient désignés par la direction des partis politiques. Enfin, les 
suffrages donnés étaient exprimés en faveur des partis politiques. Mais parce que, depuis 
un certain temps déjà, les travailleurs n'adhèrent plus aux syndicats pour des raisons 
d'ordre politique, mais en vue d'améliorer leurs conditions économiques, il s'exerce 
beaucoup de pressions à la fois sur l'Histadruth et les comités de travailleurs pour 
modifier les objectifs du syndicalisme. Ces pressions se sont manifestées à l'usine par 
l'établissement de comités d'action institués par les travailleurs partout où les comités 
de travailleurs ont adopté la politique salariale de l'Histadruth. Dans les usines où les 
comités de travailleurs sont devenus sensibles aux revendications de leurs commettants, 
comme ils n'ont pas le droit de participer aux négociations collectives, ils ont manifesté 
leur force en essayant d'intervenir dans l'aménagement des processus de fabrication ou 
autres domaines connexes qui étaient auparavant considérés comme des chasse gardée 
de la direction. Ainsi pouvaient-ils, du moins partiellement, servir la cause de leurs 
membres. Le résultat concret de ces tactiques qu'on acceptait comme des tensions 
«normales» entre employés et dirigeants d'usine se sont-elles graduellement transpo-
sées en tensions « contre nature » entre le travailleur et son syndicat. 
Au cours des deux dernières décennies, la plupart des comités de travailleurs 
ont changé d'objectifs. Malheureusement, ceci ne fut pas suivi d'un examen formel et 
d'une définition nouvelle de leurs rôles, de leurs obligations et de leur autorité. La 
centrale resta centralisée, du moins théoriquement, n'assignant aucun rôle aux comités de 
travailleurs dans la négociation collective. La seule issue qui était laissée aux comités de 
travailleurs, c'était de s'engager officieusement dans la négociation collective, c'est-à-dire 
de débattre avec les employeurs salaires et conditions de travail au-delà des accords 
conclus entre la centrale et le patronat. À l'occasion de nombre de ces négociations 
officieuses, les comités de travailleurs furent forcés de déclencher une grève qui, dans 
les circonstances, n'était pas autorisée par la centrale. 
Cet exposé nous incite à conclure qu'il s'impose d'une manière urgente de chan-
ger les structures de la centrale. Et le seul changement qui puisse être acceptable 
pour la base syndicale, c'est que l'Histadruth soit plus réceptive à leurs revendications, 
en augmentant le rôle et l'autorité des comités de travailleurs dans le processus des 
négociations collectives et en formulant une politique salariale indépendante. Plusieurs 
de ces modifications furent réalisées au cours des dernières années. On peut ainsi les 
énumérer: la démocratisation des centrales, principalement en ce qui concerne la tenue 
des élections aux échelons supérieurs, l'établissement par la centrale d'un comité spécial 
chargé d'étudier les questions qui se rattachent à la structure de la centrale et la mise 
au point d'une politique salariale plus indépendante que celle qui fut adoptée par l'an-
cien secrétaire et le secrétaire général actuel de l'Histadruth. C'étaient là autant de pas 
dans la bonne voie. Mais il est encore besoin de changements plus radicaux en vue de 
transformer la structure de l'Histadruth de façon qu'elle devienne une véritable centrale 
syndicale plus qu'une organisation politique. 
